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JAPAN LINE, LTD. V. COUNTY OF LOS
ANGELES*
THE FOREIGN COMMERCE
CLAUSE: AN ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF
STATE TAXATION
In examining the scope of a state's power to tax foreign and
interstate commerce, the principle that such commerce should
"pay its own way" plays a recurring role.1 The commerce
clause 2 presents no obstacle to the application of this principle
for its purpose is not "to relieve those engaged in foreign and'3
interstate commerce from their just share of the tax burden."
Imposed taxation is the quid pro quo for benefits actually conferred by the taxing state, 4 and it is accepted that some burden
5
should be borne by the recipient of those benefits.
In tracing the origin of this principle, a logical starting point
is the Supreme Court's opinion in Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co. 6 In Hays, the Court was faced with the question of
7
whether California could impose a full ad valorem property tax
on a vessel whose owner was domiciled and subject to taxes in
New York. The Court held that California lacked jurisdiction to
tax the vessel.8 The "home port" was declared to be the proper
* 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
1. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
2. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 2 provides: "The Congress shall have the
power to ...regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states . .. ."
3. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).
4. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 289 (1976).
5. The principle of "pay your own way" holds true even though the cost
of doing business is thereby increased. E.g., Western Live Stock v. Bureau
of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).
6. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1855).
7. An ad valorem property tax is a tax of a fixed proportion of the value
of the property to be charged. BALLANTINES' LAw DICTIONARY 39 (3d ed.
1969).

8. The Court asserted that:
We are satisfied that the state of California had no jurisdiction over
these vessels for the purpose of taxation; they were not, properly, abiding within its limits, so as to become incorporated with the other personal property of the state; they were there but temporarily, engaged in
lawful trade and commerce with their situs at the home port, where the
vessels belonged and where the owners were liable to be taxed for the
capital invested and where the taxes had been paid.
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and exclusive situs for purposes of property taxation. 9
Following Hays, the home port doctrine retained its vitality,
being reaffirmed as to coastal vessels traveling among the ports
of different states 0 and extended to vessels moving in inland
waters.' The doctrine remained viable until an attempt was
made to extend its application to instrumentalities of commerce12 traveling on land in Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania.13
In Pullman'sPalace,the concept of apportionment 4 was injected into commerce clause analysis. Apportionment allows a
nondomiciliary state to recover the value of benefits conferred
upon those whose operations extend interstate. Thus, it narrows the scope of the home port doctrine. The Pullman'sPalace
Court permitted Pennsylvania' 5 to levy a tax on the rolling stock
of an interstate rail carrier incorporated under the laws of Illi58 U.S. (17 How.) at 598-99.

9. The home port of the vessel was determined by § 3 of the Act of Dec.

31, 1792 (now codified at 46 U.S.C. § 17 (1970)), where it was provided that
"every ship or vessel ... shall be registered by the collector of the district,
in which it shall be comprehended the port to which the ship or vessel shall

belong,..

. and

which port shall be deemed to be that at or nearest to which

the owner ... usually resides." 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 597.

The situs rule was extended in Morgan v. Parham, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 471,
479 (1872), where it became a test for determining burdens on interstate

commerce. The Court characterized the tax as "an interference with the
commerce of the country not permitted to the states." The foundation of
the home port doctrine blurred in subsequent decisions. For example, in
Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. County of Alameda, 12 Cal. 3d 772, 528 P.2d 56, 117
Cal. Rptr. 448 (1974), it was apparent to the court that: [Tihe earlier decisions dealing with the validity of local property taxes on instrumentalities
of foreign and interstate commerce appear to be based at least in part on
the commerce clause; they refer to an area of commerce subject to the "laws
of the general government, to which belong the regulation of commerce
with foreign nations and between the states." Id. at 781 n.9, 528 P.2d at 62
n.9, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 454 n.9 (quoting Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 58
U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1855) (emphasis added). The Japan Line Court took
the position that the "IhI ome Port doctrine can claim no unequivocal Constitutional source .... [TIhe Hays court did not rely on the commerce
clause .... [TIhe basis of the Home Port doctrine, rather was common

law jurisdiction to tax." Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S.
434, 443 (1979).
10. Southern Pac. Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (1911); Morgan v. Parham,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 471 (1872).
11. Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U.S. 409 (1906); St. Louis v.
Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423 (1871).
12. The Court has defined an instrumentality of commerce as "various
forms of transportation equipment." 441 U.S. at 444.
13. 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
14. Used as the basis for the assessment in Pullman'sPalace was such
proportion of the railroads capital stock as the number of miles over which
cars were run by the railroad in Pennsylvania bore to the total number of
miles in Pennsylvania and other states in which Pullman's cars were run.
Id. at 19.

15. Id.

1980]

Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles

nois. The tax was apportioned according to the track mileage
within the taxing state as compared to total track mileage in all
other states. Though Pennsylvania's tax was upheld, a distinction was drawn between commerce on land and commerce on
water.16 State interference with transportation by water was
forbidden because "the vehicles of commerce by water being instruments of intercommunication with other nations, the regulation of them is assumed by the National legislature.' 7 The
home port doctrine was further eroded in Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co.,18 where the Court saw no practical difference between vessels and railroad cars that move in interstate
commerce, and approved an apportioned tax on barges navigating inland waterways. 19
The apportionment concept was most recently extended in
Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization & Assessment,20 where the taxation of aircraft that travel in interstate commerce was permitted. The taxpayer relied on Hays to
support the contention that its aircraft attained no taxable situs
in Nebraska, 2 1 analogizing their planes to ocean-going vessels.
The Court found a closer relationship between planes flying interstate and boats that ply the inland waters, 22 and it concluded
that Ott controlled.
These cases illustrate that interstate commerce does "pay
its own way," subject only to the following limitations: only a
portion of an interstate organism may appropriately be attributed to each of the various states in which it functions, 23 and the
tax in practical operation must be related to opportunities, bene24
fits, or protections conferred or afforded by the taxing state.
These requirements were satisfied in Pullman'sPalace,Ott, and
16. Id. at 23-24.
17. Id. at 24 (quoting Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 456, 470
(1874)).
18. 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
19. The taxpayers in Ott were foreign corporations engaged in transporting freight in interstate commerce, up and down the Mississippi and
Ohio rivers. The corporations held Certificates of Public Convenience and
Necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
20. 347 U.S. 590 (1954); see Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322
U.S. 292 (1944). In Northwest Airlines, a full tax was levied by the corporations state of domicile on aircraft traveling in interstate commerce. It was
held that the tax violated neither the commerce clause nor the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. None of the taxpayers planes were
"continuously without the state during the entire tax year." Id. at 299.
21. Id. at 599.
22. Id. at 600.
23. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. at 174.
24. Id.
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Braniff, where the taxes were fairly apportioned to the commerce transacted within the taxing states.
With Braniff being the Supreme Court's last step in the continuing erosion of the home port doctrine, 25 an unanswered
question remained: what is the status of the home port doctrine
with respect to instrumentalities of foreign commerce? This issue was resolved by the United States Supreme Court's decision
26
in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles.
FACTS AND LOWER COURT DECISIONS

27

The taxpayers, six shipping lines incorporated under the
laws of Japan, 28 have their principal places of business and commercial domiciles in Japan. 29 All of the taxpayers' vessels are
registered in Japan, where they have their home ports. The vessels are engaged solely in foreign commerce. 30 The containers,
like the vessels, are used exclusively in foreign commerce,3 1 and
are never used for interstate or intrastate transportation of
32
cargo except as continuations of their international voyages.
Each container has a Japanese home port.33 The average stay of
any of the containers in California at any one time is less than
three weeks.3 4 During the tax years3 5 of 1970, 1971, and 1972, a
number of the taxpayers' containers were physically present in
Los Angeles County. This number is fairly representative of the
number of containers present in Los Angeles County on other
25. The home port doctrine was somewhat revived by the California

Supreme Court in Scandinavian Airlines Sys., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 11, 363 P.2d 25, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1963),
where an apportioned property tax on foreign-owned airplanes flying exclu-

sively in foreign commerce was invalidated.
26. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
27. The facts were stipulated on appeal. Agreed Statement in Lieu of
Clerk's and Reporters Transcripts 29, Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Agreed Statement].
28. The six shipping lines are: Japan Line, Ltd.; Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd.; Mitsu O.S.K. Lines, Ltd.; Nippon Tusen Kaisha; Showa Shipping
Co.; and Yamashita Shinnihan Steamship Co.
29. Agreed Statement, supra note 27, at 31 (Stipulation #15).
30.

Id.

(Stipulation

#16).

In

addition, all vessels are specifically

designed and created to accommodate the subject containers and carry
cargo only in such containers. Id. (Stipulation #18).
31. Id. at 30 (Stipulation #5).
32. Id. (Stipulation #6).
33. Id. at 35 (Finding of Fact #9). Moreover, each container is in constant transit, save for repair time and time awaiting the loading of cargo. Id.
at 31 (Stipulaton #11).
34. Id. (Stipulation #13).
35. Under California law, a property tax year commences on the first
day of July of each year. However, the tax is applicable to all property
within the taxing jurisdiction on the preceding March first, commonly referred to as the "lien date." CAL. [REv. & TAX] CODE §§ 401.3 & 2192 (1968).
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dates throughout the tax year.36 On the first of March, 37 property physically present in California is subject to an ad valorem
property tax. California assessed 8 and levied taxes on the taxpayers' containers.3 9 The taxes were timely paid,4° and suits for
36. Agreed Statement, supra note 27, at 35 (Finding of Fact #16).
37. See note 35 supra.
38.
Fair Market Values
Plaintiff
Japan Line, Ltd.
Kawasaki Kisen
Kaisha, Ltd.
Mitsui O.S.K.
Lines, Ltd.
Nippon Yusen Kaisha
Showa Shipping Co.
Yamashita-Shinnihon
Steamship Co.
Assessed Values

1970

1971

1972

$ 765,000

$ 885,550

$1,696,900

1,250,000

977,720

1,768,280

1,251,000
1,389,000
595,000

1,228,860
1,213,400
553,200

1,342,200
1,473,920
564,340

824,000

835,400

734,040

Japan Lines, Ltd.
191,250
221,375
424,225
Kawasaki Kisen
Kaisha, Ltd.
$ 312,525
$ 244,430
$ 442,070
Mitsui O.S.K.
Lines, Ltd.
312,750
307,215
335,550
Nippon Yusen Kaisha
347,250
303,350
293,480
Showa Shipping Co.
148,750
138,300
144,088
Yamashita-Shinnihon
Steamship Co.
206,000
208,850
182,760
39. Pertinent provisions in California's tax code are as follows:
CAL. (REv. & TAX.] CODE § 201 (1939): "All property in this State, not
exempt under the laws of the United States or of this State, is subject to
taxation under this Code."
CAL. [REV. & TAx.] CODE § 117 (1939): "'Lien date' is the time when
taxes for any fiscal year become a lien on property."
CAL. IREv. & TAX.] CODE § 405 (1939): "Annually, the assessor shall assess all the taxable property in his county, except state-assessed property,
to the persons owning, claiming, possessing, or controlling it on the lien
date."
CAL [REV. & TAX.] CODE § 401.3 (1939): "The assessor shall assess all
property subject to property taxation according to its value on the lien
date."
CAL. [REv. & TAX.] CODE § 2192 (1939): "Except as otherwise specifically provided, all tax liens attach annually as of 12:01 a.m. on the first day of
March preceding the fiscal year for which the taxes are levied."
40.
1970
1971
1972
Japan Line, Ltd.
Kawasaki Kisen
Kaisha, Ltd.
Mitsui O.S.K.
Lines, Ltd.
Nippon Yusen Kaisha
Showa Shipping Co.
Yamashita-Shinnihon
Steamship Co.

$20,512.32

$25,822.70

$54,297.83

33,519.55

27,515.03

56,581.86

33,543.68
37,243.95
15,954.03

34,763.52
35,367.71
16,628.77

42,948.05
37,563.38
18,057.89

22,094.22

23,930.17

23,392.00
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refunds were brought in the Superior Court for the County of
41
Los Angeles.
The superior court ruled in favor of the shipping lines and
granted the requested refunds. 42 Relying on the California
Supreme Court's opinion in ScandinavianAirlines System, Inc.
v. County of Los Angeles,43 the lower court held that as "instrumentalities of foreign commerce 'the containers' are still afSince the taxes
forded the benefits of the Home Port rule."''
were assessed, levied, and collected on an apportioned basis
rather than under the home port rule, the property tax was held
unconstitutional under the commerce clause.
The Supreme Court of California reversed the superior
court's decision by substantially adopting the opinion of the California Court of Appeals. 45 The taxpayers unsuccessfully argued that the home port doctrine was still viable in the area of
foreign commerce, where apportionment cannot be substituted
except perhaps by treaty or other agreement. 46 The court responded by stating that in Sea-Land Services v. County of Alameda,4 7 it had specifically addressed the same contention and
48
clearly rejected it.

Initially, the court unanimously held that the home port
doctrine does not shield a taxpayer's property from a fairly apportioned ad valorem tax levied by a nondomiciliary state with
41. Agreed Statement, supra note 27, at 30 (Stipulation #4).
42. Intended Decision of the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles, Appendix A to Jurisdictional Statement, 262 [hereinafter cited as Intended Decision].
43. 56 Cal. 2d 11, 363 P.2d 25, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1963).
44. Intended Decision, supra note 42, at 272. The rationale behind the
intended decision was that:
A tax levied on the containers by Los Angeles County would violate
this section (Commerce Clause] because it was stipulated that plaintiffs pay a tax in Japan. There is no way to prorate the same, as we do in
interstate commerce. The Japanese would be paying a double tax,
while a domestic company would, by reason of proration, be paying
only one tax. To consider proration of taxes with foreign entities is not
practical. There is no tribunal that can adjudicate these rights unless it
be the International Court and to invoke its services jurisdiction must
be consented to by all parties. For this reason ...

vessels which are

instrumentalities of foreign-commerce can be taxed in their home port
only.
Id. at 282.
45. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 20 Cal. 3d 180, 571 P.2d
254, 141 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1977).
46. Id. at 185, 571 P.2d at 257, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
47. 12 Cal. 3d 772, 528 P.2d 56, 117 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1974). In Sea-Land,
imposition of an ad valorem property tax was upheld against a domestic
corporation that owned and operated containers engaged in interstate and
foreign commerce.
48. 20 Cal. 3d at 185, 571 P.2d at 257, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
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which the taxpayer has sufficient contacts, even if the taxpayer
is engaged in foreign commerce. 49 Second, the threat of double
taxation from foreign taxing authorities was said to have no role
in commerce clause consideration of multiple burdens, since
burdens in international commerce are not attributable to discrimination by the taxing state and are matters for international
50
agreement.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION

The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of
the Supreme Court of California. 5 1 Jurisdiction was invoked
under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).52 The Court commenced its consider49. Id.

50. Id. (citing Scandinavian Airlines Sys., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles,
56 Cal. 2d 11, 363 P.2d 25, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1963) (Traynor, J., dissenting).
The court rejected two additional contentions raised by the taxpayers. The
first was that in practical effect the taxes were indirect duties of tonnage.
The court replied that under Michelin Tire imports and duties "are essentially taxes on the commercial privilege of bringing goods into the country;
while nondiscriminatory and ad valorem property taxes apportion the cost
of benefits among its recipients. This being so, the taxes cannot be regarded as tonnage duties." 20 Cal. 3d at 186, 571 P.2d at 258, 141 Cal. Rptr. at
909.
The court also rejected the argument raised by the taxpayers that the
containers were being taxed in transit in violation of Michelin Tire. The
continuous presence of the taxpayers' containers, the court stated, rejects
the notion of a fleeting presence which the exemption announced in Michelin Tire requires. Id. at 187, 571 P.2d at 259, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
The final point offered by the taxpayers and rejected by the court was
that the tax violated certain United States treaty obligations and was therefore invalid under the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. In support
of this contention the taxpayers cited a 1953 treaty between the United
States and Japan which includes a most favored nation provision with respect to ownership and possession of movable property. The court rejected
the challenge stating that properly interpreted, the treaty does not apply to
local property taxation at all. Id. at 189, 571 P.2d at 261, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
51. Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissented for substantially the same reasons
set forth by Justice Manuel in the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court
of California. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434,
457 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
52. The statute reads in pertinent part:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a state in
which a decision could be had may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
as follows: ... (2) By Appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of
a statute of any state on the grounds of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in
favor of its validity.
28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1970). The Supreme Court of California sustained the
validity of its tax statute against the taxpayers' contention that it was unconstitutional under the commerce clause, tonnage duty clause, and various
American treaties. The United States Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction "would seem manifest." 441 U.S. at 440.
The Court's jurisdiction did not appear "manifest" to appellees, who at-
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ation of the merits of the case with an account of the home port
doctrine's origin 53 and evolution.5 4 Mindful of the unique status
granted ocean-going vessels in several prior cases condoning apportionment, the Court framed the question presented as:
"[W]hether instrumentalities of commerce that are owned,
based, and registered abroad and that are used exclusively in
to apportioned ad
international commerce, may be subjected
55
valorem property taxation by a state."
The response to this issue necessitated formulation of a
three-segment test, with the first part consisting of four components. When a state seeks to tax instrumentalities of foreign
commerce, the following inquiry is required:56 the state tax may
tempted to recharacterize the California court's decision as one refusing to
extend a constitutional immunity from taxation, rather than sustaining the
validity of its tax statute against constitutional challenge. Id. at 440.
53. See notes 1 &2 and accompanying text supra.
54. 441 U.S. at 441-44.
55. Id. at 444. In structuring its narrow opinion, the Court did not reach
the question of taxability of either foreign-owned instrumentalities engaged
in interstate commerce or domestically-owned instrumentalities engaged in
foreign commerce. Id. at 444 n.7.
56. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that California's tax was
prohibited by the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between
Japan and the United States, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. This treaty
provides:
Article XI(1):
Nations of either party residing within the territories of the other
Party, and nations and companies of either Party engaged in trade...
within the territories of the other Party, shall not be subject to the payment of taxes, fees or charges imposed upon or applied to income, capital, transactions or any other object, or to requirements with respect to
the levy or collection thereof, more burdensome than those borne by
nationals and companies of such other party.
Article XI(4):
In the case of companies of either Party engaged in trade or gainful
pursuit within the territories of the other Party, and in the case of nationals of either Party engaged in trade or other gainful pursuit within
the territories of the other Party but not resident therein, such other
Party shall not impose or apply any tax, fee or charge upon any income,
capital or other basis in excess of that reasonably allocable or apportionable to its territories nor grant deductions and exemptions less
than those reasonably allocable or apportionable to its territories ....
Article XXII(2):
The term most-favored-nation treatment means treatment accorded within the territories of a Party upon terms of no less favorable
than the treatment accorded therein, in like situations, to nations, companies, products, vessels or other objects, as the case may be, of any
third country.
The provisions, the Court noted, interdict discrimination, and the taxpayers
did not show that Japanese containers are treated any differently than domestic ones for purposes of California's tax.
Also rejected for the same reason was the argument that the tax contra-
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only be applied to an activity that has a substantial nexus with
the taxing state, the tax must be fairly apportioned, it must not
discriminate against foreign commerce, and it must be fairly related to the services provided by the taxing state.5 7 If the tax
satisfies this initial threshold, two additional considerations require analysis. First, whether the tax, notwithstanding apportionment, creates a substantial risk of international multiple
taxation; and, second, whether the tax prevents the federal government from "speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments. 58s A state tax
adverse to either of these mandates is repugnant to the commerce clause, and is therefore unconstitutional.5 9 It was this
novel approach that guided the Supreme Court in striking down
the California property tax as exceeding permissible limitations
on state taxation.
ANALYsIs

Complete Auto Transit,Inc. v. Brady
All tax burdens do not impermissibly impede foreign and
interstate commerce. 60 When examining a state tax to determine whether it tips the commerce clause balance and amounts
to an unconstitutional burden, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady61 controls. The initial segment of the Supreme Court's
inquiry into taxation of foreign commerce is derived from this
vened provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat.
15], 16], T.I.A.S. No. 1700, art. III, para. (1) &(2) (1947). The agreement provides in pertinent part:
IT] he contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other inter-

nal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use
of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mix.
ture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions,
should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford
protection to domestic products.
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into

the territory of any contracting party shall not be subject, directly or
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.
Other issues not reached or considered by the Court were: (1) whether
California's tax constituted an indirect duty of tonnage proscribed by U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3, (2) whether the imposition of the California tax violated the taxpayer's due process rights, and (3) whether the tax constituted
"Imports or Duties" proscribed by U.S. CONST.art. 1, § 10, cl. 2.

57. The test is derived substantially from Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).

58. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976).
59. 441 U.S. at 451.
60. See Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring
Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750 (1979).
61. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
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case. Complete Auto's underlying premise is that a state, by exacting more than its fair share of commercial revenues, unduly
burdens interstate commerce. The investigation required by
Complete Auto is not novel in commerce clause analysis. 62 Yet,
it possesses several inherent weaknesses.
Complete Auto's situs element 63 will characterize the taxable interstate activity of a foreign container in one of two ways.
First, if the taxpayers' containers travel along a "fixed and regular route, '6 4 regardless of the length of time spent in each country, a situs is established therein. Alternatively, a United States
tax situs can be established even where a foreign corporation's
instrumentalities do not travel along "fixed and regular routes."
"Habitual employment" within the taxing jurisdiction may be
sufficient. 65 Taxation in this situation would be calculated on
"average presence" of the instrumentalities in the
the fictional
66
country.
Two points illustrate the inadequacy of these characterizations. Pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 10.41a(a)(1),67 bonded containers 68 are required to be released by customs without payment of
duties and are to be treated as not having entered the United
States. It follows therefrom that a container having no "pres62. The test has been applied in Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S.
607 (1962); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska, 347 U.S. 590 (1954); and Ott v.
Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
63. If a tax is to be sustained against commerce clause challenge, it
must be applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing
state. In simple terms, a tax situs must be established. This is the first
element of the Complete Auto test.
64. Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607, 615 (1962). It must be
noted that the Court did not determine whether Japan Line's containers
traveled over "fixed and regular routes."
65. The "habitual employment" must be of a substantial number of instrumentalities. Id.
66. California's tax was based on the "average presence" of the taxpayer's containers. 441 U.S. at 445 n.8. "Average presence" is a term denoting habitual employment.
67. 19 C.F.R. § 10.41a provides: Lift vans, cargo vans, shipping tanks,
skids, pallets, and similar instruments of international traffic; repair components.
(a) (1) Lift vans, cargo vans, shipping tanks, skids, pallets, caul
boards, and cores for textile fabrics, arriving (whether loaded or empty) in
use or to be used in the shipment of merchandise in international traffic are
hereby designated as "instruments of international traffic" within the
meaning of section 322(a), Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. The Commissioner of Customs is authorized to designate as instruments of international traffic, in decisions to be published in the weekly Customs Bulletin,
such additional articles or classes of articles as he shall find should be so
designated. Such instruments may be released without entry or the payment of duty, subject to the provisions of this section.
68. A bond serves as security to ensure that a container is not used in
interstate or intrastate commerce.
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ence" under federal law can have no "presence" under Complete
Auto. 69 In addition, California law does not authorize utilization
of the "average presence" fiction. Section 205 of the California
Administrative Code requires that movable property have a situs within the taxing jurisdiction for a period equal to at least
six months. 70 Redefinition of the situs element in the realm of
foreign commerce seems necessary.
Another problem with Complete Auto centers on what is a
fair relationship. 71 While indicating that interstate and foreign
commerce must '"pay their own way," the Supreme Court has
required that any tax in practical operation bear a "fair relation"
to benefits conferred.7 2 Confusion arises, however, when an attempt is made to define what constitutes a "fair relation." Complete Auto was grounded in several cases 73 which used language
69. Cf. McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414 (1939) (New York sales

tax imposed on sales to vessels engaged in foreign commerce of fuel oil
manufactured from imported crude petroleum in bond held invalid as infringing Congress' power to regulate commerce). It was stated in McGoldrick:
It is evident that the purpose of the Congressional regulation of the
commerce would fail if the state were free at any stage of the transaction to impose a tax which would lessen the competitive advantage conferred on the importer by Congress, and which might equal or exceed

the remitted import duty.

The Congressional regulation, read in the light of its purpose, is
tantamount to a declaration that in order to accomplish constitutionally
permissible ends, the imported merchandise shall not become a part of
the common mass of taxable property within the state, pending its disposition at ships' stores and shall not become subject to the state taxing
power. The customs regulation prescribing the exemption from state
taxation, when applied to the facts of the present case, states only what
is implicit in the congressional regulation of commerce presently involved.
Id. at 429 (emphasis added).
70. 18 CAL. AD. CODE § 205 (1939) provides:
(a) General. Movable Property is all property which is intended
to be, and is, moved from time to time from one location to another
Movable property has situs where located on the lien date if it has
been in the county for more than six of the twelve months immediately
preceding the lien date and if it is to remain in or be returned to the
county for any substantial period during the twelve months immediately succeeding the lien date ....
Property which does not have situs where located on the lien date
pursuant to the previous paragraph has situs at the location where it is
normally returned between uses or, if there is no such location, at the
principal place of business of the owner.
71. The element of apportionment which constitutes part two of the
Complete Auto test will be discussed in conjunction with multiple taxation.
See text accompanying notes 82-106 infra.
72. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska, 347 U.S. 590, 600 (1954).
73. General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964) (upholding
imposition of gross receipts tax measured by taxpayer's wholesale activities
within Washington); Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minne-
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of general rather than specific benefit. The language becomes
critical when one considers the substantial differences in tax liability resulting from court determination that a tax must relate
to a general rather than a specific benefit. 74 In justifying exactions by a state75 under a general benefit standard, judicial scrube invalidated as having
tiny is lenient, 76 and a tax will seldom
77
no relation to benefits received.
The trend, however, seems to be shifting from a general
benefit standard towards a somewhat stricter approach. In
Michelin Tire, the court held that the imposition of a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on imports is the "quid pro
quo for benefits actually conferred by the taxing state. '7 8 The
Court's resort to specific benefit language indicates that such a
tax must bear more than a minimal relation to benefits or services rendered to the taxpayer. 79 The tax imposed by California
sota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959) (upholding imposition of income taxes on foreign
corporations computed at a nondiscriminatory rate on that proportion of
the net income from the corporation's interstate business which was reasonably attributable to its business activities within the state); Memphis
Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948) (upholding imposition of a
franchise or excise tax on a natural gas pipeline, used exclusively interstate, as recompense to the state for protection of "local activities in maintaining, keeping in repair and otherwise manning" the 135 miles of pipeline
within the state); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940) (upholding imposition of a tax for privilege of declaring and receiving dividends
from property located in Wisconsin, equal to a specified percentage of such
dividends).
74. See Illinois Central R.R. v. Decatur, 147 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1893) (sets
forth differences between user fees and general revenue exactions).
75. The expenditures incurred by the municipalities in the maintenance
of the port facilities used by the taxpayers are recovered through two types
of specific charges imposed upon the user of port facilities. First, the owner
of the vessel is required to pay a dockage charge for the privilege of mooring
the vessel. Second, the owner of cargo passing through the harbor is required to pay a wharfage charge for goods passing over the wharf. These
charges are used to pay the costs of the port facility, including the costs of
police protection, road service, and, in some instances, fire protection.
76. See note 73 supra.
77. Clark v. Paul Grey, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 594 (1939).
78. 423 U.S. 289.
79. Specific benefit language has been utilized in upholding several different kinds of taxes. Such language most frequently appears in the user
fee cases:
To justify the exaction by a state of a money payment burdening interstate commerce, it must affirmatively appear that it is demanded as reimbursement for the expense of providing facilities, or of enforcing
regulations of the commerce which are within its constitutional power
.... This may appear from the statute itself... or from the use of the
money collected, to defray such expense.
Ingles v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290, 295 (1936). See generally Comment, Limitations
on State Taxation of Foreign Commerce. The Contemporary Vitality of the
Home Port Doctrine,127 U. PA. L. REV. 817 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Limitations on State Taxation].
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is a general levy which is used to fund any and all public needs,

apparently without regard to the provision of any specific benefits provided to taxpayers.8 0 Moreover, the tax is measured by
the value of the container, a criterion which appears to lack any
relationship to use of services. 81 Unfortunately, the Court has
failed to provide the states with a solid standard to be employed
when subjecting its taxes to Complete Auto's benefit/relation
test. All of this leads to the conclusion that while Complete
Auto is potentially suited to foreign commerce clause analysis it
lacks the precision it appears to bestow.
The Risk of Multiple Taxation
Having satisfied the Complete Auto segment of the Court's
newly constructed test, two additional considerations will present themselves. The first requires inquiry into the problems
surrounding multiple taxation. The second presents questions
regarding federal uniformity.
All taxes add to the expense of carrying on interstate and
foreign commerce. 82 Yet it is not for this reason that a tax will
be prohibited. Taxes that have been repeatedly invalidated are
those that have
placed on the commerce burdens of such a nature as to be capable,
in point of substance, of being imposed . . . or added to . . . by
every state which the commerce touches, merely because interstate commerce is being done, so that without the protection of the
commerce clause it would bear cumulative burdens not imposed on
80. The various agencies entitled to receive a portion of the property tax
revenues include:
Taxing Agency
Los Angeles
County
Unified Schools
Junior College
Flood Control
Water Replenish
Water Agencies
Mosquito Abatement

Rate

1%]

2.5157
4.0882
4.7952
.4489
.3552
.0012
.1700
.0057

12.3801
Total
There are undeniably significant "spillover effects" that may benefit the
owner of instrumentalities of foreign commerce. The owner, for example,
may rely upon the local school system to produce an educated workforce.
Brief for the Appellees at 21, Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441
U.S. 434 (1979).
81. Newer containers, for example, require the payment of more taxes
than older ones, even though the same services are used.
82. See generally Developments in the Law, Federal Limitations on
State Taxation of InterstateBusiness, 75 HARv. L REV. 953 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law].
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local commerce ....83
Multiple taxation, in other words, places interstate and for-

eign commerce at a disadvantage because intrastatecommerce

does not bear an equal burden.8 4 The concept of apportionment
has its foundation in the doctrine prohibiting multiple burdens. 85 Logically, the risk of double taxation is slight when a tax
is fairly apportioned.8 6 This stems from the Supreme Court's
ability to enforce full apportionment by all potential taxing authorities. 8 7 The Court acknowledges its supervisory role in the
interstate commerce apportionment process, but at the same
time recognizes its lack of similar authority in foreign commerce
cases. 88 Therefore, in the context of foreign commerce, apportionment provides less than a satisfactory solution; especially,
where imposition of multiple burdens may have international
repercussions.8 9 Japan, for example, taxes all of the subject containers. 90 A California tax that reflects a container's presence in
the state inevitably leads to the taxpayers being forced to pay
more than one full ad valorem property tax. The vice of such a
tax is that it subjects foreign commerce "to the risk of a double
tax burden to which [interstate] commerce is not exposed, and
which the commerce clause forbids." 91
Justice Traynor, in his dissenting opinion in Scandanavian
Airlines Systems, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, considered and
rejected the position that the risk of multiple taxation plays a
role in foreign commerce clause analysis. 92 "Multiple burdens,"
83. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 255 (1938).
84. Limitations on State Taxation, supra note 79, at 828; Developments
in the Law, supra note 82, at 965.
85. In Ott, the Court in commenting on the tax imposed in Pullman's
Palace stated "that tax... has no cumulative effect caused by the interstate character of the business. Hence there is no risk of multiple taxation
...." 336 U.S. at 174. Likewise, in Northwest Airlines, Justice Stone, after
criticizing the undue proportion of taxes exacted under a Minnesota statute, believing it to be unconstitutional, suggested that "[ i] t is enough that
the tax exposes petitioner to the risk of a multiple burden to which local
commerce is not exposed." 322 U.S. at 327 (dissenting opinion).
86. California argued that after the decision in Moorman Mfg. Co. v.
Blair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978), the fact that a state tax creates multiple burdens is
insufficient to condemn it under the commerce clause. The Court rejected
California's argument, distinguishing Moorman from the instant case. The
question presented in Moorman was not whether a state may tax instrumentalities of foreign commerce but whether apportionment under the
commerce clause calls for mathematical exactness or rigid application of a
particular formula.
87. 441 U.S. at 446-48.
88. Id.
89. See text accompanying notes 124-26 infra.
90. Agreed Statement, supra note 27, at 31 (Stipulation #14).
91. 441 U.S. at 448.
92. Scandinavian Airlines, Sys., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d
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he stated, are:
[A] ttributable to the freedom of foreign countries to adopt rules of
their own. Merely because a state court is without jurisdiction to
compel independent nations to adopt a uniform nondiscriminatory
system of taxation, it does not follow that the states must forego the
93
power to impose taxes that are not in themselves discriminatory.
Traynor's S.A.S. dissent was adopted in Sea-Land Service, Inc.
v. County of Alameda, where the court concluded that "apportionment among nations is a matter for international agreement;9 it should not be considered as a limitation on a state's

power to tax. ' 95 This attack, however, was confined to the
element of discrimination. Absent from his analysis is consideration of the other Complete Auto elements. 96 A nondiscriminatory tax must yield, for example, if it is not fairly related 97 to
benefits provided, or as in Japan Line, when it impairs federal
uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential.9 8
Japan Line's limitations on state taxing powers reveals two
inconsistencies with prior decisions. First, in Michelin Tire,99
where the Court upheld the imposition of a general ad valorem
property tax on imported tires and tubes, the double taxation
issue was not even considered. It was accepted that the country
of manufacture' 0 0 had authority to and may actually have taxed
Michelin's tires and tubes on an ad valorem basis. If Georgia,
the state of storage and distribution, also possessed power to tax
the goods ad valorem, there would have existed a multiple burden which the commerce clause forbids. 1 1
11, 32, 363 P.2d 25, 38, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, 38, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1963)
(Traynor, J., dissenting).
93. Sea-Land Servs. v. County of Alameda, 12 Cal. 3d 772, 778, 528 P.2d
56, 67, 117 Cal. Rptr. 448, 459 (1974).
94. Such an argument defeats rather than supports California's position. That California has created a problem susceptible only to Congressional solution concedes that state taxation of foreign-owned instrumentalities is an area where a uniform federal rule is essential. 441 U.S. at
455.
95. Sea-Land Servs. v. County of Alameda, 12 Cal. 3d 772, 778, 528 P.2d
56, 67, 117 Cal. Rptr. 448, 459 (1974).
96. In addition to the requirement that a tax be nondiscriminatory,
Complete Auto inquires into whether the instrumentality has a nexus with
a taxing state, the manner of apportionment, and whether the tax is fairly
related to the services provided by the taxing state. See text accompanying
note 75 supra.
97. See text accompanying notes 72-80 supra.
98. See text accompanying notes 113-23 infra.
99. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
100. 25% of the tires and tubes are manufactured in and imported over
land from Nova Scotia. The remaining 75% are brought to the United States
from France and Nova Scotia by sea, in containers. Id. at 280.
101. 441 U.S. at 448 (quoting J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 302 U.S. at 307
(1938)) (upholding construction of a gross receipts tax statute confining
exemptions to taxation ad valorem).
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Furthermore, the Court's demand that restrictions be
placed on state power to tax is inconsistent with the principle
that foreign commerce must "pay its own way."' 10 2 Imposition of
such restrictions results in a situation where a foreign corporation's tax liability bears no "relation to opportunities, benefits,
10 3
Ultior protections conferred or afforded by the taxing state."'
mately, the local taxpayer must subsidize services used by a foreign corporation. This result is clearly contrary to the mandates
10 6
10 5
of Ott,10 4 Braniff, and Michelin Tire.
The Necessity of Federal Uniformity
In justifying its retreat from the "pay your own way" maxim,
the Supreme Court noted: "Although the Constitution ...
grants the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several states in parallel phrases, there is evidence
that the founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce
power to be greater.' 10 7 Simply put, the immunity from taxation
granted to the taxpayers' containers originates in the greater
reach of the commerce clause when foreign commerce is involved. Thus, two different sets of rules emerge.
In analyzing the negative implications of Congress' power
over foreign commerce, early cases are helpful. While the commerce clause conferred on Congress the power to regulate commerce, its possession of authority did not extinguish all state
regulatory powers. In Cooley v. Board of Wardens,10 8 the states
were viewed as possessing a residium of power, in a dormancy
situation, to enact laws governing matters of local concern 0 9
which "nevertheless in some measure affect[ed] interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate[d] it." 110 It is equally
clear that there are powers which, by their nature, are vested
exclusively in Congress. The subject of these powers "are in
their nature national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of
102.
103.
104.
105.

See text accompanying notes 1-6 supra.
Ott v. Mississippi Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949).
Id. at 169.
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska, 347 U.S. 590 (1954).

106. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976).

107. 441 U.S. at 448.
108. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1855).

109. This rule applies in the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress.
110. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (state regulation making it unlawful to operate within state a passenger train of more
than 14 cars or a freight train of more than 70 cars held invalid under commerce clause; regulation was characterized as one requiring uniformity of
treatment free from state interference).
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regulation. . ... ""' Implicit in the Court's reasoning is that the
regulation of foreign commerce demands uniformity of regulation possible only through exclusive regulation by the federal
government. Thus, even in a dormancy situation, Congress'
power alone invalidates nondiscriminatory, fairly apportioned
state taxation of instrumentalities of foreign commerce. 112 This
13
foreign-interstate dichotomy utilized by the Court to premise'
its divergence from the "pay your own way" principle dictated
the manner in which it would fashion the final portion of its
three-part inquiry. The Court held that a state tax which prevents the United States from "speaking with one voice" in the
regulation of foreign trade is inconsistent with Congress' power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations and is unconstitu114
tionally violative of the commerce clause.
111. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298, 319 (1851).
112. In support of this distinction, the Court in Railroad Co. v. Maryland,
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 456, 470 (1874), noted that "vehicles of commerce by water
being instrumentalities of intercommunication with other nations, the regulation of them is assumed by the National Legislature. So that state interference with transportation by water and especially by sea, is at once
clearly marked and distinctly discernable." Further support is found in the
case of Bowman v. Chicago & N. Rwy., 125 U.S. 465 (1888), where the Court
stated:
The inference to be drawn from the absence of legislation drawn by
Congress on the subject excludes state "affecting commerce with foreign nations more strongly than that affecting commerce among the
states." Laws which concern the exterior relations of the United States
with other nations and governments are general in their nature and
should proceed exclusively from the legislative authority of the nation.
The organization of our state and Federal Government is such that the
people of the several states can have no relations with foreign powers
in respect to commerce or any other subject, except through the government of the United States, its laws and treaties.
Id. at 482.
In Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48
(1933), the university insisted that while discharging state functions it was
entitled to import articles duty free. The university's contention was rejected, and to support its decision the Court stated that: "[tlhe principle of
duality in our system of government does not touch the authority of the
Congress in the regulation of foreign commerce." Id. at 57.
113. Distinctive rules for foreign commerce were specifically rejected by
Justice Taney in the License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847), where he
said: ' The power to regulate commerce among the several states is granted
to Congress in the same clause, and by the same words, as the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and is coextensive with it." Id. at
578; see Clark, Property Taxation of Foreign Goods and Enterprise-A
Study in Inconsistency, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 39, 44 n.22 (1976) (author
takes the position that while federal power over each area is complete,
there is no special set of rules for foreign commerce).
114. In Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos.,
435 U.S. 734 (1979), a business and occupation tax applied to stevedoring
was held constitutional as not violating either the commerce clause or the
import-export clause. The tax as applied to the business of stevedoring did
not restrain the ability of the federal government to regulate foreign commerce for "no foreign business or vessel is taxed." It follows from the

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 13:793

The Japan Line Court indicated three events that would
frustrate the achievement of federal uniformity by "preventing
this nation from speaking with one voice." 115 To begin with, international disputes might arise over the several different types
of apportionment formulae used by the states. Disputes of this
kind have arisen domestically, and a court of competent jurisdiction can resolve such controversies. 1 6 But in the international arena, there exists no such authoritative tribunal. Such
disputes are inevitable as long as the several states compute the
117
amount of taxes due under diverse apportionment formulae.
Another possible event, designated by the Court as frustrating federal uniformity, would arise where a novel state tax creates an asymmetry in the international tax structure, and a
"disadvantaged nation retaliates." Retaliation of this sort would
necessarily affect the nation as a whole. Japan imposes property taxes on instrumentalities of foreign commerce by using an
equivalent of the home port doctrine. Shipping containers domiciled in the United States that are located from time to time in
Japan are not subject to property taxation in that country. 118
California, by imposing its tax, has created an asymmetry the
result of which operates to Japan's disadvantage. To illustrate;
the tax sanctioned by the California Supreme Court prompted
eleven foreign governments, including Canada, Denmark,
France, Japan, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United
Kingdom to issue formal expressions of concern to the State DeCourts statement that state taxes on foreign vessels or containers carried
thereon will prevent the federal government from "speaking with one

voice" in the regulation of foreign commerce.
115. 441 U.S. at 451-54. The three illustrations discussed by the Japan
Line Court were not considered in Michelin Tire, though the facts
presented in that case were ideally suited to such analysis. In Michelin
Tire, the Georgia tax was held to have no impact on the power of the federal
government to "speak with one voice" when conducting foreign relations.
116. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Blair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978) (upholding imposition of a single-factor sales formula for apportioning an interstate corporation's income for state tax purposes under the commerce clause and due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment). Because apportionment formulae vary from state to state, some overlapping taxation may occur. The
taxpayer, however, can be assured that there is a rough approximation or
ceiling which determines the total tax to be paid.

117. In Moorman, Iowa's law prescribed a single-factor apportionment
formula, while Illinois used a three-factor formula. Id. at 270-71. A singlefactor formula is presumptively valid, and the produced assessment will
only be disturbed when the taxpayer has proved by "clear and cogent" evidence that the income attributed to the state is in fact "out of all proportion
to the business transacted ...in that state" or has led to a grossly distorted
result. Id. at 273-74.
118. Agreed Statement, supra note 27, at 32 (Stipulation #25).
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partment. 119
More importantly, the laws of several countries, including
the Federal Republic of Germany, grant exemptions from taxation only on the basis of reciprocity. 120 The imposition of taxes
on American-owned containers would follow automatically with12 1
out further legislative action by any one of these countries.
Clearly, state taxation of instrumentalities of foreign commerce
upsets' the preservation of uniform federal regulation in the area
of foreign commerce.
The last event illustrates the proposition that the nation
would be prevented from "speaking with one voice" if the several states, following California's example, imposed taxes of
their own, 122 thereby subjecting foreign instrumentalities of
commerce to varying degrees of multiple taxation. 23 The danger inherent in varying degrees of multiple taxation is not, however, as pronounced as the Court's illustration indicates. After
the Michelin Court upheld the imposition of nondiscriminatory
ad valorem property taxes on imports, the expected flood of similar tax statutes in other states did not materialize. 24 The reasons are apparent; first, several states do not levy personal
property taxes on tangible assets. 125 Of those that do, some re119. See Exhibits E-P, Appendix A to Jurisdictional Statement. The letter from the Government of Japan to the State Department reads:
March 27, 1978
The State of California has imposed a property tax on containers
which are owned by foreign shipping lines and kept at Los Angeles terminals for repair or loading. The problem has thus arisen that containers of Japanese ship-owners are doubly taxed by the local governments
of Japan and the United States. This tax burden impedes the smooth
development of trade between the two countries.
The Japanese Government, being seriously concerned about this
situation, requests that the Government of the United States take appropriate actions to terminate the imposition of the California tax and
have the tax already paid by the Japanese shipping lines refunded.
120. VERMOGENSEUERGESETZ

(VS&G)

§ 2,

par. 3,

reprinted in

BUNDESGESETZBLATr (BVB1) (4-23-74) (W. Ger.)
121. The European Economic Community decided on June 12, 1978 to
study suitable counter-measures to take against non-member states whose
practices are detrimental to the maritime interests of the members states.
Brief for the Appellants at 20, Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441
U.S. 434 (1979).
122. Pursuant to the opinion dated January 31, 1978, of the Oregon Department of Justice, the State of Oregon reversed its position and decided
that a personal property tax can lawfully be imposed upon ocean-going containers within Oregon. Brief for the Appellants at 11, Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
123. 441 U.S. at 453.
124. See Hellerstein, Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages. Enhanced State
Power to Tax Imports, 1976 SUPREME COURT REV. 99 (1977).
125. Id. at 128. Those states are: Pennsylvania, Hawaii, Delaware, and
New York.
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fuse to impose such taxes to the fullest extent that they are constitutionally permitted. For example, the Illinois Attorney
General issued an opinion declaring that Michelin would have
no effect on the current Illinois statute exempting from taxation
126
certain personal property when stored in its original package.
Second, over thirty-five states have "free port" laws that allow goods to be stored in a state on a tax-free basis under conditions that frequently exempt imports. 127 The purpose behind
many of these laws is to enhance a state's status as a distribution center and to stimulate its economy. 128 An ianalogous situation is presented with respect to the taxation of
instrumentalities of foreign commerce. It is unlikely that a state
seeking to enhance its economy will rush to follow California's
example by imposing similar taxes which would help defeat its
goals.
After considering the three aforementioned events, the
Court drifted from its dormancy analysis and rested its reasoning, in part, on the exclusivity of the federal government's power
to conduct foreign affairs. 129 The Customs Convention on Containers, 30 signed by both the United States and Japan, clearly
126. Opinion of Attorney General No. NP 1125 (July 15, 1976), reportedin
Report Bulletin No. 5, 5.9, P-H State and Local Taxes (all states unit)

(Aug. 3, 1976).
127. CCH STATE TAX GUIDE (All States) 20-100 (Chart of State Free
Port Law Requirements) (1967). To qualify for free-port exemption, goods
generally must satisfy some or all of the following conditions: (1) They
must have an out-of-state origin and/or destination; (2) they must be stored

in a public or other facility not owned by the consignee or consignor; and
(3) they must remain in their original packages.

128. One such law is O.R.S. 307.810-5 (1975). The purposes of the Senate
bill were enumerated in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. State Tax Comm'r, 244 Or. 561,
419 P.2d 608 (1966):
Sponsors of the bill assert that its enactment will be beneficial to
Oregon because Oregon is so geographically situated as to be a natural
distribution point for commerce which either originates in or is destined to Washington, California and overseas points ....
SB 424 is designed to enhance Oregon's status as a distribution

center and to stimulate the state's economy. Its sponsors feel that its
enactment will improve Oregon's competitive tax position and divert
commerce through the state which otherwise would not accrue to Ore-

gon.
Id. at 565-66, 419 P.2d at 611.

129. "Complete power over international affairs is in the National Government and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference
on the part of the several states." United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331
(1937).
130. The Customs Convention on Containers, 20 U.S.T. 301, T.I.A.S. No.

6634, provides:
Chapter I, Article 1 (a):
For purposes of this Convention:
(a) The term "import duties and import taxes" shall mean not
only Customs duties but also all duties and taxes whatsoever chargea-
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sets forth as the policy of the United States development and
facilitation of the use of containers in international commerce. 13 1 The California tax thwarts rather than promotes this
132
goal and "will frustrate the attainment of federal uniformity."'
The Court appears, in this portion of its analysis, to confuse
commerce clause principles with Federal preemption doctrine.
It suggests that the states recoup the value of their services in
the form of user fees. Logically, the Court has created a distinction without a difference because a series of specific user fees
would produce the same counter-productive effect as the California tax. It is the amount exacted 133 rather than the manner in
which revenues are used that will either facilitate or hinder the
international use of containers.
CONCLUSION

In its recent attempts to define the permissible scope of
state taxation, the Supreme Court has developed a methodology
emphasizing economic considerations. 1 34 Accordingly, analysis
has centered on the substantive content of various tax tests.
This focus, however, is a novel one where foreign commerce is
concerned, and it is clear that the approach advanced in Japan
Line mandates a result contrary to that reached in Michelin
Tire. What Michelin Tire lacks under Japan Line is a genuine
scrutiny of the negative effects of state taxation. By either igble by reason of importation. Chapter II, Article 2: Each of the Contracting Parties shall grant temporary admission free of import duties
and import taxes and free of import prohibitions and restrictions, subject to re-exportation and to the other conditions laid down in articles 3
to 6 below, to containers when they are imported loaded, or imported
empty to be re-exported. Each Contracting Party shall retain the right
to withhold these facilities in the case of containers which are imported
on purchase or otherwise taken into effective possession and control by
a person resident or established in its territory; the same applies to containers imported from a country which does not apply the provisions of
this Convention.
131. Brief for the United States at 28-29. It is expressly stated therein:

[T]he imposition of the property tax in question "would frustrate accomplishment of the federal objective in allowing temporary free admission to the containers under bond" and "[lessen] the effectiveness
of the federal regulation by burdening foreign-owned containers with a
multiple tax burden that hinders the use of such containers in our for-

eign commerce."
132. The adverse impact of the tax seems to impair the exclusive power
of the federal government to conduct foreign relations and would therefore
constitute a violation of the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. 6, § 2, rather

than the commerce clause.
133. The opinion in McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414 allows the
prohibition of any tax which raises the price of goods Congress seeks to
benefit.
134. Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos.,
435 U.S. 734 (1979).
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noring or denying the existence of such an economic approach,
Michelin Tire invited state taxation without limitation.
What this novel approach compels is case by case determination of the validity of state taxes in the realm of foreign commerce. The effect of a multiple burden or an interference with
federal uniformity will be reviewed in light of its economic impact on the nation as a whole. Where the impact adversely affects a desired economic position, the tax will be invalidated.
This mechanism is needed to insure world-wide favorable treatment of American-owned goods and instrumentalities and to resolve the tensions "that are unavoidable in a world of sensitive
35
sovereigns in matters touching their dignity and interest."
Marc W. Sargis

135. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958).

